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PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES:
NEWFOUNDLAND AND NOVA SCOTIAʼ’S
STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE THE PROMISE OF
PETROLEUM WEALTH
MATTHEW CLARKE†

ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of some key issues which have arisen
since the implementation of political resolutions to the contentious issue
of offshore governance. Through an examination of: i) the role of the
Petroleum Boards which manage offshore development; ii) the royalty
and beneﬁts regimes in place offshore Newfoundland and Nova Scotia;
iii) the impact of the federal equalization scheme on provincial offshore
revenues; and iv) some critical perspectives of the current offshore governance arrangements, this paper provides a background for the larger
question of whether, in fact, the provinces have achieved the status of
“primary beneﬁciaries” as originally envisioned by the provincial and
federal governments. While this question is not conclusively answered
herein, the suggestion made is that, from the perspective of maximising
beneﬁts for the provinces, the management regimes currently in place
invite room for signiﬁcant improvements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will review beneﬁts and royalty regimes which govern the
offshore oil and gas industries in the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador.1 Rather than providing a detailed analysis of
any single aspect of the regimes, it surveys the major issues in this area,
and attempts to address a number of questions. The questions posed are
as follows: Who regulates the offshore, and where does this authority
to do so come from? What are the goals of the regulatory regime; are
these goals being met, and if not, what are the impediments standing in
the way?
Part I provides a necessary background. This consists of a review
of the political arrangement reached between the federal and provincial governments to govern the management of offshore petroleum. In
Part II, the structure of the royalty and beneﬁts regimes governing the
provincesʼ’ offshore industries are examined, along with the related issue of federal equalization payments. Part III provides a brief look at
the policies that Norway and the United Kingdom adopted during the
development of the North Sea oil and gas industry in order to encourage the growth and viability of their own domestic supply and service
industries. This material provides a point of comparison and contrast to
the strategy adopted in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. Finally, Part
IV addresses a number of critical perspectives on the Atlantic Canadian
beneﬁts and royalties regimes. While not drawing any ﬁrm conclusions,
it is hoped that these perspectives will assist in an analysis of whether
the provinces have gotten what they originally expected from the jurisdictional arrangements governing their offshore industries.

II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE REGULATORY
REGIMES
It would be ineffective to undertake an examination of the existing regulatory regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore
oil industries without having an understanding of the legal and political
1

For convenience, the author refers to the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador as “Newfoundland” in the remainder of this essay.
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background underlying these regimes. The current regimes emerged as
a solution to years of competing claims by the governments of the provinces and the federal government over control of offshore oil and gas
resources, both in the political and legal sphere. This tumultuous period
eventually culminated in a political agreement in the form of the Atlantic Accord2 and in legislation that was intended to give the agreement
legal effect. This section lays out the legal foundation upon which this
compromise was built.
1. The Atlantic Accord: A Political Solution
It is not surprising that the agreement ﬁnally reached by Newfoundland and the federal government was grounded in politics rather than in
strict legal entitlements. Commentators have noted that, “[t]he politics
of Newfoundland and its impact on oil and gas development has and, no
doubt, will continue to be as crucial a determinant in the development
of the offshore as will any legislative enactment.”3 The Hibernia Reference4 (in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the continental
shelf rights rested with the federal government) was a bitter disappointment to the Newfoundland Government, which continued to maintain
a “moral entitlement” to control the offshore. This position was buoyed
by a frustration over its lack of control of its ﬁsheries, as well as a determination to overcome high levels of unemployment.5 The province had
no choice but to seek a negotiated agreement with the federal government.
Following the decision in the Hibernia Reference, the Newfoundland government, noting that the federal Progressive Conservative party
(then in opposition) was enjoying an upswing in popularity, began negotiating with party representatives. The federal Tories had publicly tak2

The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government Of Canada And
The Government Of Newfoundland And Labrador On Offshore Oil And Gas Resource Management and Revenue Sharing (11 February 1985) [Atlantic Accord].
3
C.P. MacDonald & R.S.G. Thompson, “The Atlantic Accord: The Politics of Compromise”
(1985) 24 No. 1 Alta. L. Rev. 61 at 61-62 [Macdonald and Thompson].
4
Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984]
1 S.C.R. 86, 5 D.L.R. (4th) 384 [Hibernia Reference cited to S.C.R.].
5
Hunt, Constance D., The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia (Calgary:
Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1989) at 5-6 [Hunt].
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en the position that the provinces should have signiﬁcant control over
offshore management, a policy position maintained during Joe Clarkʼ’s
short tenure as Prime Minister in 1979. Clark had discussed a transfer
of jurisdiction in 1979, but the PCs were defeated before this could happen. In the wake of the Hibernia Reference decision “Ownership” of
the resource could no longer be claimed by the province, so the terms
of the discussion were adapted. In 1984, newly elected Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney expressed his willingness to facilitate Newfoundland
participation in the offshore. Earlier discussions between Mulroney and
Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford became the basis of the Atlantic
Accord in the aftermath of the Tory election victory.6 The Atlantic Accord was a political agreement that provided a blueprint for a legislative framework for shared jurisdiction over the development of offshore
resources.
The Atlantic Accord agreement was signed by Premier Peckford
and Prime Minister Mulroney on February 11, 1985. Following this,
the federal and provincial governments began the process of drafting
the reciprocal sets of legislation that would form the legal framework to
govern the Newfoundland offshore area. Because the province had no
jurisdiction to extend legislation to the offshore area (one of the ﬁndings
in the Hibernia Reference), “mirror legislation” was required to create a
sphere of shared jurisdiction for the federal and provincial governments.
Federal legislation was required which would referentially extend provincial legislation to the offshore. On April 4, 1987, the Atlantic Accord agreement was ﬁnally implemented by Canada - Newfoundland
Accord-Implementation Act7 and the Canada - Newfoundland Atlantic
Accord Implementation Newfoundland Act8 both coming into force.
In 1982, Nova Scotia reached an agreement with the federal government to jointly share the management of offshore petroleum resources.9
The agreement contained a “most - favoured province” clause. This

6

Ibid. at 13.
S.C. 1987, c. 3 [Newfoundland Accord Act].
8
Later renamed the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation
Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-2 [Newfoundland Accord Act (Newfoundland), and collectively with the Newfoundland Accord Act, the Newfoundland Accord Acts].
9
Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and Revenue
Sharing (2 March 1982) [1982 Nova Scotia Agreement].
7
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clause provided that if the federal government entered into an offshore
oil and gas management agreement with any other province prior to January 1, 1985 (i.e. Newfoundland), the Nova Scotia government could
substitute the latter agreement in its entirety for the entirety of its existing agreement.
Nova Scotia invoked the clause, and on August 26, 1986 the Prime
Minister and Premier of Nova Scotia signed the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord.10 The Nova Scotia Accord ultimately led to the passing of the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act11 and the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova
Scotia) Act12, which served to extend joint jurisdiction to the Nova Scotia offshore area, just as the Newfoundland Accord Acts had done for
the Newfoundland offshore.
The following section discusses the purposes of the Accord agreements as they were set out at the time of their creation, and the structure
of the joint-management regimes that these deals created. It also examines the beneﬁts and royalty regimes that the agreements provided for,
and describes the impacts of the federal equalization formula on the
provincesʼ’ abilities to beneﬁt from the revenues thereby generated.

10

Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord (26 August 1986) [Nova Scotia
Accord].
11
S.C. 1988, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act].
12
S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [together with the Nova Scotia Accord Act, hereinafter Nova Scotia Accord
Acts]. The Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 8 and the Nova Scotia Accord Acts are referred
to as the Accord Acts.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATORY REGIMES UNDER THE
ACCORD ACTS
1. The Stated Purposes of the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia
Accord
As noted in the section above, the political settlements reached through
the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia Accord were implemented into law
through “mutual and parallel legislation.”13 One requirement of this
legislation was the assurance that certain powers that would otherwise
be exercised by the federal and provincial ministers in respect of the marine and shelf areas beyond the low water mark off the provinces, would
be exercisable by the joint petroleum boards (discussed below). Another
was to complete the framework of rules for shared decision-making as
envisioned by the two Accord agreements.14 In short, the extension of
provincial laws and decision-making powers into the offshore areas was
accomplished through a combination of administrative inter-delegation
and legislative referential incorporation.15
Section 2 of the Atlantic Accord16 and section 1.02 of the Nova Scotia Accord17 set out the similar objectives that those agreements sought
to facilitate. For the most part, the provisions of these sections are identically worded. There are several themes in the agreements that are central to the current discussion. These include:
1) The idea that the development of offshore oil and gas reserves
should occur for the beneﬁt of Canada in general and of the
provinces in particular (see section 2(a) of the Atlantic Accord
and section 1.02(a) of the Nova Scotia Accord);
2) The recognition that the provinces have the right to be the
principal beneﬁciaries of the oil and gas resources off their
shores (section 2(c) of the Atlantic Accord and section 1.02(c)
of the Nova Scotia Accord);
13

Supra note 2 at s. 1.
Supra note 3 at 63.
15
See Alan Pettie, “Are Royalty Agreements Required for Canada East Coast Offshore Oil and
Gas?” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J.151 at 180-181 [Pettie].
16
Supra note 2.
17
Supra note 10.
14
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3) The recognition of the equality of the Federal and Provincial
Governments in the management of the resources, as well as
the need to ensure that development is optimized to provide
economic and social beneﬁts to the country generally and the
provinces speciﬁcally (section 2(d) of the Atlantic Accord and
section 1.02(d) of the Nova Scotia Accord), and;
4) The provision that the provinces can establish and collect
resource revenues as if the resources were on land within the
provinces (section 2(e) of the Atlantic Accord and section
1.02(e) of the Nova Scotia Accord).

In reviewing these themes, it is important to not only recognize the acceptance by the Federal Government of shared jurisdiction over offshore
resources, but also the strength of the commitments that the revenues
and beneﬁts arising from the development of these resources would primarily beneﬁt the provinces. A critical examination of the beneﬁt and
royalty regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore
industries requires a focus on these key principles. The question asked
herein is, “are the current regimes meeting the general objectives set out
in the Accord agreements?”
2. Shared Jurisdiction - The Boards and Industrial Beneﬁts
The implementation of the Accord Acts18 established the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) and the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB). These boards have the
delegated authority to administer most aspects of the management and
regulatory regimes within their respective offshore areas. A. Taylor and
J. Dickey have commented that the establishment of the boards under
the Accord Acts is central to the administration of the offshore regimes
in two respects. First, much of the decision-making process was shifted
from the bureaucracies at the two levels of government in each region
to an entity separate from government. Second, the level of discretionary power held by the administrator (previously the Minister under the

18

Supra note 12.
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Canada Oil and Gas Act19) was diminished and instead provided betterdeﬁned criteria and processes by which decisions are to be made.20
The mandates of the boards are derived from the Accord Acts, and
include the issuance of and administration over petroleum exploration
and development rights in their respective offshore areas; the administration of statutory requirements regulating offshore exploration, development and production; and the approval of Canada-Newfoundland and
Canada-Nova Scotia beneﬁts and development plans.21 For the purposes
of the present discussion, we are most concerned with these “beneﬁts
plans.”
The Nova Scotia Accord Acts22 and the Newfoundland Accord Acts23
all contain provisions (section 45 in each case) describing the contents
of the beneﬁts plan that is required of every proponent who applies to
the boards for approval of a development project. The wording of these
provisions is nearly identical. For illustrative purposes, section 45(1)
from the Newfoundland Accord Act (Newfoundland)24 is reproduced below:
45. (1) In this section “Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador
beneﬁts plan” means a plan for the employment of Canadians and,
in particular, members of the labour force of the province and...
for providing manufacturers, consultants, contractors and service
companies in the province and other parts of Canada with a fair
opportunity to participate on a competitive basis in the supply of
goods and services used in a proposed work or activity referred to
in the beneﬁts plan.

Taylor and Dickey have noted the difﬁculties that the relatively intangible elements of “full and fair opportunity to participate” and “ﬁrst consideration” have caused the boards in their attempts to construe these
requirements.25 The ﬁrst offshore oil project in Canada was the Cohas19

R.S.C. 1985, c. O-6 as rep. by the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.36 (2nd
Supp.), s.130.
20
A. Taylor et al., “Regulatory Regime: Canada-Newfoundland/Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board Issues” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 51 at 56-57.
21
Ibid. at 59.
22
Supra note 12.
23
Supra note 8.
24
Supra note 8.
25
Supra note 20 at 77-80.
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set project in offshore Nova Scotia. The project operator (LASMO Nova
Scotia, later PanCanadian) ﬁled its beneﬁts plan in December 1989,
about a month before the C-NSOPB was established. One of the boardʼ’s
ﬁrst tasks was to decide how to assess how a “full and fair opportunity”
was to be afforded. The view taken by the C-NSOPB at that time, which
it continues to hold, is that a “full and fair opportunity” is demonstrated
through the requirement that an operator abide by a procurement policy
that is “open, fair and predictable.”26
Taylor and Dickey argue that many of the complaints made by observers who claim that local interests are not receiving a fair share of the
work generated by offshore projects arise because of a lack of understanding of the inherent “competitiveness” element of the “full and fair
opportunity” requirement. They write that:
[U]nlike the C-NSOPB, these commentators have no knowledge of
how bids on any particular contract stack up in terms of commercial,
technical, or quality competitiveness. Indications are, however, that
local companies are becoming increasingly competitive as they gain
more experience and local infrastructure grows.27

The second important element in deﬁning the beneﬁts plan is “ﬁrst consideration.” Subsection 45 (3) of the Accord Acts requires that a beneﬁts
plan commits to providing “ﬁrst consideration” to “individuals resident
in the province” for training and employment, and also states that “ﬁrst
consideration is to be given to services provided from within the Province and to goods manufactured in the Province, where those services
and goods are competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and
delivery.”28
Again we see that a competitiveness criterion is involved in the deﬁnition of “ﬁrst consideration.” As Taylor and Dickey explain by continued reference to the Nova Scotia context, the C-NSOPBʼ’s interpretation of this principle envisions it being applied at two stages during an
operatorʼ’s procurement process. The ﬁrst is during the establishment of
the bidderʼ’s list and the second is at the contract award stage. If there
are a sufﬁcient number of qualiﬁed local bidders, then the list should
26

Supra note 20 at 77.
Supra note 20 at 78.
28
Accord Acts, supra note 12, s. 45(3)(b).
27
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be conﬁned to these local bidders. It is argued that the objective of the
Accord agreements, that the respective provinces should be the principle beneﬁciaries of offshore development, is operationalized in this
manner.29 The second stage of application of the “ﬁrst consideration”
criterion occurs when an operator is presented with a situation in which
there are competing bids submitted which contain varying degrees of
local content, but are otherwise essentially equal in terms of price and
quality. In such a situation, the operator is expected by the board to
award the contract to the bidder with the greater degree of local content.
However, the authors note the limits on the boardsʼ’ abilities to reward
bids that maximize local content. They observe, “it also must be acknowledged that usually bids are not equal. If pressed, an operator can
usually identify some ʻ‘materialʼ’ difference, be it technical, commercial
or otherwise.”30
Like any administrative decision maker, the boards can only operate within their statutorily authorized domains. Their jurisdiction to
oversee and enforce speciﬁc measures with regard to industrial beneﬁts
plans is limited to what is explicitly provided for in the enabling legislation. As becomes apparent in a review of the legislation (as above),
the indeterminate language used does not easily provide for ﬁrm and
comprehensive levels of local participation in offshore development.
The limitations inherent in these provisions regarding their ability to
actively boost local participation are discussed in greater detail later in
this paper.
3. Royalties
The issues surrounding the generation of royalties and taxes by government from offshore petroleum development are extremely numerous
and complex. Due to the limited scope of this paper, the discussion
is limited to an examination of the legal source of the provincial governmentsʼ’ abilities to levy royalties and taxes against operators in the
offshore industry and a brief description of the mechanisms employed
to do this. Also, the issue of provincial equalization payments must be
29
30

Supra note 20 at 79.
Supra note 20 at 79.
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discussed in this context, as it is a key limiting factor in any improvements that are to be hoped for in the provincesʼ’ ﬁnancial affairs.
Despite the provincesʼ’ legislative competence to levy royalties and
certain forms of taxation against the oil companies exploring for and
producing petroleum in their offshore areas, there are a number of factors that are at play in the structures of and limits upon these sources of
revenue. One important factor is that the petroleum production industry
is global. For this reason, the governments must monitor the various ﬁscal regimes in petroleum producing regions around the world to ensure
that local exploration and production remains viable and attractive to
petroleum companies.31 Royalty regimes will either encourage or discourage development depending on the degree to which they impact
proﬁtability. The Nova Scotia and Newfoundland governments must
also consider the ﬁscal instruments they employ based on their larger
strategies to extract social and economic beneﬁts from these developments. It is in this context that the desired industrial beneﬁts discussed
above have to be factored into overall development strategies.32
The source of the provincial authority to levy royalties against offshore producers arises pursuant to the provincial acts that the Accord
Acts referentially incorporate, and the regulations that are established
thereunder. In Nova Scotia, these are the Offshore Petroleum Royalty
Act33 and the Offshore Petroleum Royalty Regulations.34 In Newfoundland, these are the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act35 and the Royalty
Regulations.36
Both provinces originally negotiated individual royalty agreements
with offshore producers, such as the operators of the Cohasset and Sable developments off Nova Scotia and the operators of the Hibernia
and Terra Nova projects off Newfoundland. Such agreements were extremely complex and time consuming to reach. For example, the Hibernia royalty agreement took more than a year to negotiate, while the
31

Watkins, G.C., “Atlantic Petroleum Royalties: Fair Deal or Raw Deal” (2001) Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (Paper #2 in AIMS Oil and Gas Series).
32
M. Harrington et al., “Emerging Issues In East Coast Oil and Gas Development” (1997) 35
No. 2 Alta. L. Rev. 269 at 293.
33
S.N.S. 1987, c. 9.
34
N.S. Reg. 71/99.
35
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-10.
36
Nﬂd. Reg. 84/01.
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Sable agreement took a year and a half.37 The indeterminacy, complexity and cost associated with the need to negotiate royalty agreements on
a project-to-project basis is a disincentive to offshore development, and
has led both provincial governments to develop generic royalty regimes
for their offshore areas in order to establish a predictable mechanism for
determining royalty levies.
4. Equalization
The federal equalization program operates pursuant to the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act.38 This program makes payments to
the provinces whose ability to raise revenues (their “ﬁscal capacity”)
is below that of a baseline level. The formula that determines this level
measures the ﬁscal capacity of the ten Canadian provinces on the basis
of thirty-three individual revenue sources. It then determines the difference between these individual ﬁscal capacities and an average capacity
based on the average of the ﬁve provinces remaining after excluding
Alberta and the four Atlantic provinces. The federal government compares the individual provincial capacities against this average measure,
and the provinces below the average receive a per-capita payment based
on the differential.39
As noted above, petroleum royalties and related provincial taxes
bring increased revenue to the treasuries of Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia. As revenues rise, both provinces receive lower equalization
transfer payments because the provincesʼ’ ﬁscal capacity is closer to the
baseline determined by the formula described above. Because a concomitant decrease in equalization payments accompanying increased
provincial revenues was anticipated by the parties during the negotiation of the Atlantic Accord and Nova Scotia Accord, the agreements
established “equalization offset provisions” so that the provinces would
not experience dollar for dollar decreases in transfer payments as provincial revenues rose.
37

Pettie, supra note 15 at 195.
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8.
39
Boessenkool, K.J., “Taking Off the Shackles: Equalization and the Development of Nonrenewable Resources in Atlantic Canada” (2001) Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (Paper #1
in AIMS Oil and Gas Series) [Boessenkool].
38
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As the initial formulas provided a low level of protection, the federal
government responded to calls from several provinces for changes to
the preferential treatment the Atlantic offshore revenues were receiving.
In 1993, the federal government introduced a generic offset provision.40
Under this provision, if an equalization-receiving province has seventy
percent or more of a tax base, then the taxback rate (the amount that the
revenue source will diminish potential equalization payments) on that
revenue source is capped at seventy percent. Under this formula, the
equalization payment ﬂowing to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland can be
reduced by no more than seventy percent of the amount of their offshore
oil and gas revenues.
Thus far, this paper has traced the legal and political basis for the
regulatory regimes governing the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore oil and gas industries. It has also provided an overview of the
beneﬁts and royalty schemes in place, and the impact of equalization
on provincial revenue. For comparative purposes, the following section
sets out a brief description of strategies in Norway and the U.K. for the
regulation of the offshore petroleum industries, with a particular focus
on the efforts of each jurisdiction to maximize the local beneﬁts of offshore development.

IV: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS: NORWAY AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Norway and the United Kingdom often provide a basis of comparison
in critical discussions about the choices and directions taken by those
politicians and regulators who are plotting the course for the Atlantic
Canadian offshore industries. In a number of ways, Norway and the
U.K. are relevant comparators. Like Norway and the U.K., (and unlike
many of the worldʼ’s developing nations in which oil production is currently taking place) Atlantic Canada has a stable political and labour
environment, which makes it attractive to oil companies seeking new

40

Ibid. at 29.
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exploration and production opportunities.41 In other areas, there are signiﬁcant differences.
One important distinction between the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia industries and those offshore of Norway and the U.K. is that developers in the North Sea have only one level of government to deal with;
Norway and the U.K are both unitary states, meaning that their national
governments have full authority over the offshore industry. Canada has
developed a legal and regulatory framework to share jurisdiction over
the offshore between the federal and provincial governments, which
adds complexity to operating within Atlantic Canada (despite the intent
that the Petroleum Boards would provide a single regulatory authority
for most purposes).42 Also, the fact that the size of the proven reserves
of the North Sea are well beyond those which have so far been proven
offshore Newfoundland and Nova Scotia also skews efforts to draw direct comparisons between these regions.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of a general examination of the different strategies that can be utilized to maximize beneﬁts from offshore
development, Norway and the U.K. are useful points of comparison.
Economist Wade Locke has argued that the Atlantic Canadian industry
can beneﬁt from the examples of Norway and the U.K. in its efforts to
develop a regulatory environment which balances a “commercial requirement for operators to remain cost competitive with the regional
economic development requirement that “full and fair opportunity” be
given to Atlantic Canadian individuals and companies.”43
1. Norway
The most distinctive aspect of Norwayʼ’s offshore policies is the level
of direct state involvement in the industry. Since the early 1970s, the
41

McMullan, Sandy: Presentation to Oceans Law and Policy class, Dalhousie Law School,
March 12, 2003. Mr. McMullan also noted that Norway and the U.K are among the regions that
the Nova Scotia government considers as its main competitors when evaluating strategies to
attract oil companies to the region.
42
Pettie (supra note 15) has expressed concern that despite the legislative detail and complexity
of the mirror legislation that has implemented the Accord agreements, there are serious constitutional problems with the scheme, and that certain of its provisions may actually be invalid.
43
Locke, Wade, “Harnessing the Potential: Atlantic Canadaʼ’s Oil and Gas Industry: An Analysis
of the Variables Affecting Present and Future Involvement of Local Business” (1986) Background report for the Royal Commission of Employment and Unemployment, at 28 [Locke].
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Norwegian state has undertaken a central role in ensuring Norwegian
involvement in its offshore, and generally directed development of
the industry by establishing a state oil company, called “Statoil.” This
strategy was developed on the premise that Norwegian society would
receive the most beneﬁt from its offshore oil industry if the industry
could be subjected to political control.44 Through the use of this “insider
approach,” Statoil has provided a vehicle through which the state has
exercised an option for up to ﬁfty percent participation in oilﬁeld developments.45 While licences have been awarded in part on the basis of
competitive bidding, preferential treatment has been provided to Statoil
and other domestic companies during licensing rounds. In some cases,
certain parcels of land were held for these companies only, and in other
cases Statoil was speciﬁed as the operator on the licences from the outset.46
The Norwegian stateʼ’s direct involvement in individual oil developments has given it a great deal of inﬂuence over the decisions of multinationals regarding their procurement of goods and services. A second
part of the Norwegian strategy has been to require that foreign developers use Norwegian supply companies, subject to quality, pricing and
delivery considerations. These licensees are monitored pursuant to legislated powers which link the granting of future licences to their past
records of using Norwegian suppliers. In this way Statoil has broken
down the traditional purchasing practices of the large multinational oil
companies and provided access to domestic ﬁrms in the areas of design,
engineering, and project management. Known as “Norwegian Technology Agreements,” these are usually entered into at the licensing stage
and are used as a basis for transferring technology from the multinationals to the countryʼ’s domestic offshore players.47 Norway has also used
licensing to encourage foreign companies to assist in the development
of its general domestic industries.48
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Statoilʼ’s role in Norwegian oil and gas policy has been changing
dramatically over the past ten to ﬁfteen years. At present, the company
operates under the same commercial terms as the other participants in
the Norwegian offshore, and is no longer a tool of the stateʼ’s petroleum
policy. In 2000, the Norwegian state began the process of privatizing
Statoil by listing between ten and twenty-ﬁve percent of the companyʼ’s
value on the stock market, while still retaining more than two-thirds of
the company.49 This move could be viewed as an indication of the fact
that Norway now has a mature and stable petroleum industry, with a robust domestic component no longer dependent on the type of ﬁrm state
intervention described above.
Norwayʼ’s regulatory regime has largely been attributed with the notable successes enjoyed by its domestic industries. The policies put in
place during the 1970s are largely responsible for the fact that the share
of goods and services supplied to the offshore industry by domestic
ﬁrms has risen to over sixty percent.50 The result has been that Norway
has developed leading expertise in offshore oil and gas production, and
is now an exporter of such expertise to many parts of the world, including Atlantic Canada.51 While Norway may no longer require the strong
interventionist policies that it employed during the early stages of its
offshore development, the importance of these policies in developing
its domestic industry (and the social and economic beneﬁts that it has
brought) is undeniable.
2. The United Kingdom
At about the same time Norway was dealing with the offshore problem,
the U.K. was also confronted by the question of how to ensure that the
beneﬁts of offshore petroleum ﬂowed toward British workers and ﬁrms.
Unlike Norwayʼ’s “protectionist” approach, the U.K developed a strategy that has been referred to as a “free market approach.”52 U.K. ﬁrms
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initially had difﬁculty penetrating the offshore industry partially due to
the high costs associated with entering the industry and the strong existing bonds that the large multinational oil companies (mostly American)
had with their traditional suppliers (again, mostly American).53
Following the receipt in 1973 of a report by the International Management and Engineering Group (IMEG), the British Government decided to take an active role in the development of a competitive offshore
goods and supply industry. One aspect of this policy involved the creation of an Offshore Supplies Ofﬁce (OSO), which had as its mandate the
tasks of auditing oil company purchasing reports (in the effort to pressure oil companies to “buy British”) and also providing ﬁnancial assistance to the local supply industry. Auditing was essentially designed to
shame companies into providing a “full and fair opportunity” for local
suppliers to compete for contracts.54
In 1975, the British Department of Energy signed a “Memorandum
of Understanding” with the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) that further opened the purchasing process to government scrutiny. In particular, it gave the OSO auditors the ability to review
the lists of companies invited by an operator to bid on projects, and after
the bids were in, to review them. This was designed to ensure that local
bidders received the “full and fair opportunity” promised. The auditors
were not allowed to strike bidding companies off these lists, but they
could add the names of local companies. Technically, the only power
the OSO had was moral persuasion, but it was backed by the implicit
threat that an uncooperative purchaser would be treated unfavourably in
the next round of licensing, as offshore parcels were put up for bids.55
Despite some descriptions of the British governmentʼ’s strategy as “free
market,” it certainly contained some indirectly coercive elements.
Like Norway, the U.K.ʼ’s perceived need to actively protect and assist its local participants in the offshore industry seems to be waning.
Having achieved a successful and mature service industry, the British
government seems to have turned its focus to concerns that reﬂect a
53
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mature industry in its later stages of development. The government now
appears to be undertaking a facilitative role rather than an interventionist one (as was manifest in the earlier activities of the OSO). In a policy
with characteristics similar to Norwayʼ’s focus on the future, the British
government in 1998 established the “Oil and Gas Industry Task Force.”
This task force has an ambitious agenda focussing on speciﬁc areas impacting the industry, and addresses skills and training, innovation and
technology.
Despite the fact that the U.K.ʼ’s policies toward the regulation of
its offshore industries have been largely characterized as “free market”
policies, while those of Norway have been seen as “interventionist,”
this brief overview provided above demonstrates that in both cases the
respective governments took signiﬁcant steps to foster their domestic
service and supply industries. This was done in recognition of the desire
that the beneﬁts coming from the exploitation of this resource should be
maximized for the advantage of the respective nationsʼ’ service industries and labour force. The jobs and economic spin-offs that arise from
the exploitation of offshore petroleum are some of the most valuable elements of this kind of industrial development. The success of the British
and Norwegians in offshore, service and supply industries can be traced
to the support that these sectors received from their governments during
the formative stages of North Sea offshore development. The precedent
set by Norway and the U.K. is important to consider when evaluating
the policies in place to support local industries in the context of Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland. Without the protection and intervention by
the respective state governments in Norway and the U.K., it seems evident that those countries would not have developed their strong domestic supply and support industries.

V: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Among the stated goals of the Accord agreements were the objectives
that the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland would be the primary beneﬁciaries of offshore oil and gas development, and that the
provincial governments would be able to control these resources as if
they were located on land. The tangible beneﬁts that would ﬂow to the
provinces were to take the form of revenue from royalties and taxation,
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and industrial beneﬁts such as employment and local economic stimulation. From our examination of the jurisdictional and management regimes governing these resources, it becomes clear that the ability of
the provinces (with federal involvement) to achieve such objectives is
very much tied to the limitations inherent in the statutory and policy
instruments which structure offshore governance. While the determination and creativity of provincial politicians, regulators and stakeholders
are important factors to consider, the impediments that these actors face
arise for the most part from the legal and statutory underpinnings of the
regulatory environment. In the remainder of this section, some critical
perspectives on these impediments are explored.
1. Royalties and Equalization
In hindsight, it appears somewhat implausible that Newfoundland was
ever worried that the development of offshore oil would “overheat the
economy,”56 causing economic and social turmoil in the process. Yet,
expectations were high in the early years of the oil frenzy and such
problems had been witnessed during earlier development in Norway.
One explanation for why the provinces did not press harder to protect
royalty revenue from the “clawback” mechanism of the federal equalization program may be tied to the expectation that once production began, oil revenue would be so great that equalization would quickly cease
to be a concern. However, there are also indications that the provincesʼ’
weak bargaining positions in the wake of the Hibernia Reference decision also played a part; the perception seems to have existed that by
trading off direct cash revenues, signiﬁcant industrial beneﬁts might be
gained. Jim Thistle, a St. Johnʼ’s lawyer, was advising the Newfoundland government in the period of litigation with the federal government
leading up to the signing of the Atlantic Accord. He has described the
provinceʼ’s strategy as follows:
We had a scheme that emphasized jobs, technology transfer, location
of operations. All the stuff that offshore development brings, rather
than royalties. This approach is sometimes questioned - why the
emphasis? Well, money is great if you keep it. But two reasons really
drove our approach: 1) Royalty monetary gains were offset greatly
56
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by equalization losses; and 2) If we lost the court case (which was
what we anticipated) the companies couldnʼ’t just pick up all their
investment in people and infrastructure and move.57

Nevertheless, the issue of royalties from offshore oil and gas has remained prominent. After all, it is asked, if Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia really are supposed to be the primary beneﬁciaries of the offshore
(as the Accord agreements promised), why is the bulk of the revenue
(seventy percent under the “generic equalization formula” described
above) from royalties ﬂowing toward Ottawa? The simple answer is laid
out in the discussion above, and is tied to the constitutional structure of
Canada and the structure of the federal equalization program. But, such
legal formalism does not provide a satisfactory answer for many, and
numerous critiques have been made of the impacts of the equalization
program on offshore royalties.
One such critique has been advanced by economist Kenneth Boessenkool. Writing for the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Boessenkool presents a two-pronged economics argument against including
resource revenues in the equalization formula.58 The ﬁrst part of his argument is that royalties from non-renewable resources are a capital asset,
in that they are a transfer of a stock of wealth from one form to another,
without any actual increase in total wealth in the process. The same is
not true of renewable resources. From an accounting point of view, he
argues, the sale of an existing asset is not the creation of revenue, but
merely a change in the form of existing capital. Therefore, royalties
should not be considered a revenue stream for the purposes of calculating equalization transfers.59 The second part of Boessenkoolʼ’s argument
is that royalties, or “rents from the extraction of natural resources”60
are in effect capitalized throughout the wider economy as a provinceʼ’s
economy grows as a result of offshore development. Revenue sources
such as sales tax, income tax and so forth are already included in the
equalization formula, and as a result, direct natural resource revenues do
not need to be; rather, he states, it “amounts to double counting.”61
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Boessenkoolʼ’s arguments are not based on any notion of what is
“right or wrong.” Rather, they are grounded in the morally detached
“efﬁciency” paradigm that we have learned to expect from economists;
he believes that the provinces will be induced to tax resource rents in
an “inefﬁcient” manner under the current equalization structure.62 However, other criticisms of the way in which equalization operates with
regard to royalty revenues have focussed very clearly on the moral propriety of the federal “clawback” of these revenues.
One clear example of this is Nova Scotiaʼ’s lobbying effort known
as the “Campaign for Fairness.” Led by Premier John Hamm, this campaign is an effort to focus public attention on two related realities. First,
the federal government committed, through the Nova Scotia Accord,
that the province was to be the principal beneﬁciary of offshore development. Second, the federal government is receiving about eighty-one
cents of each dollar generated by offshore revenues for that province
through the equalization mechanism.63 The crux of the argument made
by Premier Hammʼ’s government is that the federal government has reneged on a solemn promise made to the province, and therefore the
equalization mechanism should not be applied to offshore resource revenues.
This position has been supported by the well-known Newfoundlander and former politician John Crosbie. Crosbie is quite familiar
with the subject, as he was Minister of Justice and Attorney General in
Prime Minister Brian Mulroneyʼ’s cabinet when the Atlantic Accord was
signed with Newfoundland, and remained in that position until just a
few weeks before the Nova Scotia Accord was signed in 1986. Crosbie,
through a spate of newspaper editorials,64 has impugned the integrity
61

Boessenkool, supra note 39 at 10.
Watkins, for his part, has also demonstrated a politically detached view of the royalty issue in
his paper for AIMS (supra note 31). While making a reasonably convincing case that Nova Scotia and Newfoundlandʼ’s royalty regimes are fair to both the provinces and the oil companies, he
also argued that royalties should not be viewed as a tool to achieve socio-economic objectives.
Rather, royalty levels should be set at levels that maximize efﬁciency (that is, where they would
maximize beneﬁts to the province without discouraging development). However, it seems an
argument that posits that revenue policies should be made in isolation from social and economic
objectives does not recognize the policy imperatives confronting governments in this context.
63
The provinceʼ’s ﬁgures are available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/Fairness99.pdf.
64
See John Crosbie, Editorial, The Globe and Mail (12 September 2001). See also National Post
June 13, 2001 and St. Johnʼ’s Telegram, October 21, 2001.
62

22 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

of the federal government for its failure to live up to the clear commitment made to the provinces regarding the right to receive the economic
revenue from offshore development. As he wrote in the Globe and Mail
on September 12, 2001:
The intent of these agreements was and is that Nova Scotia, and
Newfoundland and Labrador, should and would receive the revenues
from their respective offshore resources until their economies were
at least at the national average level. In fact, in most documents they
will remain principal beneﬁciaries until they reached 110-140% of
national standards, depending on certain circumstances.

In his editorials, Crosbie goes on to reference written and oral commitments made by past (Tory and Liberal) federal governments to the
provinces that reinforce this position.
Through Crosbieʼ’s support of these moral arguments, Nova Scotiaʼ’s
campaign has certainly received a boost, for who better than a person
who was centrally involved to attest to the meaning of the commitments
made to the provinces through the Accord agreements? At the same
time, the question remains for Crosbie that if, as he claims, the intent
was that royalty revenue would not be clawed back by Ottawa, why
were stronger protections not put in place to protect this revenue from
the equalization mechanism during his tenure? The quote from Thistle
(see text accompanying note 57), while speaking from a period of time
prior to the establishment of the equalization offset provisions in the
Accord agreements, seems to indicate that the province (in this case
Newfoundland) was anticipating from the outset that royalty income
would be largely diminished by the equalization program.
It will be interesting to see if efforts by the provinces to renegotiate
the way royalty revenues are treated by the equalization program are
successful. It appears that in the meanwhile, the solution to the economic
problems of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland will have to be sought elsewhere. What remains is the economic activity and employment spurred
by petroleum development. The beneﬁts plans that were designed to
support local involvement in these areas are addressed next.
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2. Beneﬁts Plans and their Implementation
The approaches taken by Norway and U.K. in assisting their domestic
offshore supply and support industries were reviewed above. The two
approaches were quite different, but shared the fact that both included
active protection and promotion of their local industries. In both Norway
and the U.K., the respective policies have been largely responsible for
the development of strong support industries that now export expertise
globally. In Part II of this paper, the respective sections of the Accord
Acts that provide that offshore operators provide “beneﬁts plans” was
discussed, as were the approaches that the petroleum boards have taken
in interpreting this provision. When one looks closely at this provision
one ﬁnds that its objectives are relatively clearly stated; local workers
and companies will be given “full and fair opportunity” to compete for
contracts and employment, and when other factors are equal, they will
be given “ﬁrst consideration” for those jobs and contracts. However,
what is lacking is a meaningful mechanism to implement these objectives.
In their description of the C-NSOPBʼ’s approach to local beneﬁts during the Cohasset project and that of the C-NOPBʼ’s during the Hibernia
project, Harrington et al. note that while the boards monitor the content of employment and supply contracts, their approach appears “to be
mostly based upon a commitment by the proponent to principles rather
than speciﬁc requirements.”65 More precisely, the boards monitor the oil
companies to assess the levels of local content involved in their various
projects, but do not speciﬁcally require that any level of local content is
maintained.
The “full and fair opportunity” phrase used in the openings of the
Accord Acts is identical to that which was used under the “moral suasion” approach utilized by the OSO in the U.K. This might indicate that
the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland approach was intended to work the
same way as the one employed by the OSO. However, as the Sun Oil
anecdote noted above seems to indicate, there were real and substantial
consequences for companies operating in the U.K. that did not abide
by their “gentlemenʼ’s agreements” to “buy British.”66 There has been
65
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little indication from the Atlantic Canadian boards that unsatisfactory
performances by oil companies in maintaining adequate levels of local
content in their projects will elicit penalties or sanctions. In fact, recent
developments in Newfoundland indicate that the C-NOPB is unwilling to
even deﬁne its level of expectation regarding local content.
On November 26, 2001, the C-NOPB released its ﬁnal report on the
White Rose Development Plan application and the corresponding Beneﬁts Plan application.67 The report granted approval to Husky Oil (with
some conditions) for both plans. What is more noteworthy in the context of the current discussion is the opportunity the board took in its
report to respond to recommendations that had been previously made
by White Rose Public Review Commissioner Herbert Clarke in his own
report. Clarke is not an individual who is new to industrial development in Newfoundland; he was deputy minister of development in Brian
Peckfordʼ’s administration in the early 1980s as the province challenged
the federal government for control of offshore oil.68 Clarkeʼ’s report recommended that the board establish “targets”, “quantiﬁable objectives”,
“speciﬁc goals” or “speciﬁc beneﬁts targets”, but noted “targets are not
quotas... but rather management tools.”69
The C-NOPB unconditionally rejected this suggestion. In supporting
this rejection, it progressed through several steps to demonstrate the
rationale for its conclusion. First, it refused to accept the distinction between “targets” or “quantiﬁable objectives” and quotas, and argued that
there is no authority granted in the legislation for the board to impose
targets or quotas.70 As a principle of administrative law, it also observed
that its authority to act is strictly circumscribed by the powers granted
in s. 17(1) of the Accord Acts.71 Further, it drew particular attention to
the presence of the phrase “on a competitive basis” in the wording of
subsection 45(1) of the Accord Acts:
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Canada-Newfoundland Beneﬁts Plan means a plan... for providing
manufacturers, consultants, contractors and service companies in
the Province... with a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis in the supply of goods and services [emphasis
added].72

The board reasoned that because the words “on a competitive basis”
were added to the description of a beneﬁts plan between the Atlantic
Accord stage and the implementing Accord Acts, the phrase should be
given signiﬁcant interpretive weight. The board also noted what it described as a “misconception” that either the Accord agreement or the
resulting legislation intended some measure of preference for goods and
services from the province:
This misconception is often expressed as a duty on the Boardʼ’s part
to maximize Newfoundland & Labrador/Canada content in projects.
There was a clear consensus on this in many of the presentations
during the public hearings. But, as has been noted, the Legislation
is prescriptive in this area; and is prescriptive in a manner which
precludes consideration of preference and any requirement for content
targets. Not only is there no legislative obligation to introduce such
a local preference policy, the wording of the Legislation prevents the
use of requirements which would have that effect. The Legislation
prescribes a competitive process [emphasis in original].73

This pronouncement is stunning. It is an interpretation of section 45
of the Accord Acts that all but castrates the beneﬁts plan provisions.
Further, the interpretation that the legislation “precludes consideration
of preference” is difﬁcult to understand in light of the fact that section
45(3)(d) requires that “ﬁrst consideration” be given to goods and services supplied from within the province when they are otherwise equivalent to imported goods and services. Certainly “ﬁrst consideration” must
describe a form of preferential treatment. It is clearly arguable that a
“competitive process” does not exclude this kind of preference: local
goods and services compete with imports, and if they successfully compete (i.e. they are as good or better then the imports) then they are to
be given preference. It appears that the board may have misinterpreted
section 45 by focussing too intently on the phrase “competitive process”
and failing to read all the subsections together as a cohesive provision.
72
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The argument by the board that it is not statutorily authorized to set
quotas or mandate requirements for speciﬁc levels of local participation
is also problematic. Viewed narrowly, this proposition appears, prima
facie, to be correct: there is no wording in the statute that gives the board
a mandate to set quotas for local content. However, one of the principal
tasks of the petroleum boards, both the C-NOPB and the C-NSOPB, is to
evaluate the beneﬁts plans and either accept them or reject them. Section 45(2) of the Newfoundland Accord Acts reads as follows:
Before the board may approve a development plan under subsection
135(4) or authorize any work or activity under paragraph 134(1)(b),
a Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador beneﬁts plan shall be
submitted to and approved by the board, unless the board directs
that that requirement need not be complied with.74

Clearly, the applicants cannot be approved for any development plan
unless they have submitted and had approved a Canada-Newfoundland
and Labrador beneﬁts plan. It is also clear that the board is not obliged
or compelled to accept any plan it receives. Subsection 45(3) sets out
criteria by which a plan is to be evaluated, and includes, inter alia, the
“ﬁrst consideration” provision of section 45(3)(d): where a Newfoundland business is equally able to provide the service or goods in question,
that Newfoundland business should receive preference. So, while the
board may not have a mandate to establish ﬁxed levels of local content
in offshore projects, it does have a mandate to approve beneﬁts plans
that meet the requirements of section 45 and to reject those that do not.
To do any less is to act in dereliction of its statutory duties.
Norway and the U.K. managed to develop strong service and supply industries because they protected and promoted local industry. Yet
the C-NOPB appears to be hesitant to even enforce the modest measures
provided by s. 45: that local industry be given a “full and fair opportunity” to compete with the giants in the global marketplace. If the White
Rose decision is a precedent that is followed by succeeding petroleum
boards, Newfoundlandʼ’s and Nova Scotiaʼ’s industries may not be afforded the opportunity to effectively compete against the giants in this
marketplace: giants which got their early start in the shelter of those
protective North Sea regimes.
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3. Jurisdictional and Constitutional Issues
In one sense Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are fortunate to have as
much control and to receive as much beneﬁt as they do from their offshore petroleum industries. Legally speaking (making the safe assumption that Nova Scotia is in the same position as Newfoundland), it is
Canada that has the ultimate right to beneﬁt from and legislate in respect
of the offshore. On the other hand, as we have seen, the provinces were
promised that they would beneﬁt from the resources as if they were on
land. The reality of the situation is that the provincesʼ’ lack of full jurisdiction over the offshore prevents them from ever fully realizing this
promise. Because of their lack of full jurisdiction, the provinces cannot
fully control a number of aspects of offshore development.
One such aspect is that the provinces do not have full autonomy
to negotiate on their own behalf with large multinational corporations.
While a hands-off approach on the part of the federal government may
be a vestige of the fallout from the unpopular National Energy Program
of the 1980s, some stakeholders feel that the region would beneﬁt from
an underlying national policy on offshore development that united the
individual provinces on the bases of their common interests. Elizabeth
Beale, president of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, has written, “[t]he lack of a deﬁned national interest with respect to the exploitation of this important industry stands in stark contrast to other key sectors
of the Canadian economy, including aerospace and automobiles, where
supportive policies have been instrumental in their development.”75
One must also wonder if the risk-averse multinational oil companies
feel some trepidation in sinking signiﬁcant investment capital into a region in which jurisdiction for the relevant issues is split between two
or more levels of government as well as the petroleum boards. When
deciding in which global region to undertake petroleum projects, questions like this must come into play. Further, the reassurance provided
in other countries by the fact of being able to deal with a single, unitary state government on all pertinent issues must have strong appeal
by comparison. The convoluted nature of Atlantic Canadian regulatory
regimes has also caused some legal commentators apprehension about
75
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their constitutionality.76 Further, unless the provisions granting shared
jurisdiction to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are constitutionally entrenched, changed circumstances could impel the federal government to
renounce them at any time.77
This part of the paper has provided a critical examination of some
of the major problems facing Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in their
efforts to realize the promise of the Accord agreements: that they become the primary beneﬁciaries of their offshore oil and gas industries.
As noted, the royalties generated by the industry are largely clawed
back by Ottawa through the equalization mechanism. In light of this, increased employment and industrial beneﬁts appear to be the most promising source of increased economic integrity arising from the regionʼ’s
petroleum industry. However, based on the example of the C-NOPB in
the White Rose decision, it is submitted that the position taken by the
petroleum boards has been to largely accommodate the oil companies
rather than to challenge their commitment to maximizing local beneﬁts.
Improvement will have to be made in this area if the provinces are to
realize the full economic potential of this industry.

VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying authority to govern the oil and gas resources offshore
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland is complex. As we have seen, continental shelf rights are an incidental extension of a sovereign state, in
this case Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Hibernia Reference found that it is Canada and not Newfoundland that has the right to
exploit the resources under the continental shelf and to legislate with
regard thereto. This almost certainly applies to Nova Scotia as well, but
has yet to be tested. Canada and the provinces subsequently reached
a political settlement which provided that the provinces should be the
“principal beneﬁciaries” of the offshore, to the extent that they should
beneﬁt just as they would if the resource were onshore.
This meaning of this commitment has come into question in recent
years, as the beneﬁts of provincial offshore oil and gas revenues have
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largely been negated by clawbacks in the federal equalization program.
Questions have arisen as to what the promise of becoming principal
beneﬁciaries actually meant. Were the provinces supposed to be the
principal beneﬁciaries of petroleum revenue before or after the equalization mechanism was engaged? Certainly, there is a strong argument
to be made that the interaction between royalties and equalization is not
operating as was intended nor as it should. Perhaps support from other
provinces will lead the federal government to restructure the way these
policies are currently operating, but there is no signiﬁcant indication
that this issue will be addressed any time soon.
As a result, most of the provincial hopes for beneﬁts from offshore
development have been hung on the potential for results in increased
employment and industrial development within the region. As we have
seen, the current interpretation of the beneﬁt plan requirements by the
petroleum boards do not lead to the enforcement of any ﬁrm levels of
local content. This is not to say that the tools to provide more support for
local industry do not exist within the current regulatory structure. Contrary to the position taken by the C-NOPB in the White Rose decision, it
is arguable that the current mandate of the boards could allow for a more
assertive application of the “full and fair opportunity” and the “ﬁrst consideration” principles. Examining the policies that were adopted by the
U.K. and Norway during the infancy of their offshore industries, we saw
that local support and supply industries prospered with the active and
ﬁrm assistance of state policies. There is a strong case to be made that
local industries will not develop as successfully as those in Norway and
the U.K. without similar support from the regulatory structures.
It all comes down to political will and the strength of the provincesʼ’
negotiating positions. Norway and the U.K faced a different climate in
terms of international trade regulation during their industriesʼ’ developments, and they also had much larger reserves to use as a bargaining
position with the multinational oil companies. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are hindered by more than just these two factors, however.
The inter-jurisdictional nature of the Atlantic Canadian industry requires a high level of inter-governmental cooperation to overcome these
obstacles, and achieving such cooperation has rarely proven itself to
be easy. Newfoundlanders in particular are liable to be sceptical in this
regard, as they have recently seen the domestic cod ﬁshery closed down
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once more, while government initiatives to reduce offshore dragging by
international vessels are minimal at best.
The provinces face some major hurdles if they are ever to achieve
the full beneﬁt of the offshore oil and gas industry. It has been beyond
the scope of this paper to offer the solutions. Instead it is hoped that
some of the major areas offering room for improvement have been identiﬁed.

